An official website of the United States government
Here’s how you know
Official websites use .gov
A .gov website belongs to an official government organization in the United States.
Secure .gov websites use HTTPS
A lock () or https:// means you’ve safely connected to the .gov website. Share sensitive information only on official, secure websites.
Search
Note: This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) is part of an ongoing #StopRansomware effort to publish advisories for network defenders that detail various ransomware variants and ransomware threat actors. These #StopRansomware advisories include recently and historically observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help organizations protect against ransomware. Visit stopransomware.gov to see all #StopRansomware advisories and to learn more about other ransomware threats and no-cost resources.
Actions to take today to mitigate cyber threats from ransomware:
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) are releasing this joint CSA to disseminate known Royal ransomware IOCs and TTPs identified through FBI threat response activities as recently as January 2023.
Since approximately September 2022, cyber criminals have compromised U.S. and international organizations with a Royal ransomware variant. FBI and CISA believe this variant, which uses its own custom-made file encryption program, evolved from earlier iterations that used “Zeon” as a loader. After gaining access to victims’ networks, Royal actors disable antivirus software and exfiltrate large amounts of data before ultimately deploying the ransomware and encrypting the systems. Royal actors have made ransom demands ranging from approximately $1 million to $11 million USD in Bitcoin. In observed incidents, Royal actors do not include ransom amounts and payment instructions as part of the initial ransom note. Instead, the note, which appears after encryption, requires victims to directly interact with the threat actor via a .onion URL (reachable through the Tor browser). Royal actors have targeted numerous critical infrastructure sectors including, but not limited to, Manufacturing, Communications, Healthcare and Public Healthcare (HPH), and Education.
FBI and CISA encourage organizations to implement the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this CSA to reduce the likelihood and impact of ransomware incidents.
Download the PDF version of this report:
For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see
Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK® for Enterprise framework, version 12. See MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise for all referenced tactics and techniques.
Royal ransomware uses a unique partial encryption approach that allows the threat actor to choose a specific percentage of data in a file to encrypt. This approach allows the actor to lower the encryption percentage for larger files, which helps evade detection.[1] In addition to encrypting files, Royal actors also engage in double extortion tactics in which they threaten to publicly release the encrypted data if the victim does not pay the ransom.
Royal actors gain initial access to victim networks in a number of ways including:
Once Royal actors gain access to the network, they communicate with command and control (C2) infrastructure and download multiple tools [T1105]. Legitimate Windows software is repurposed by Royal operators to strengthen their foothold in the victim’s network. Ransomware operators often use open-source projects to aid their intrusion activities; Royal operators have recently been observed using Chisel, a tunneling tool transported over HTTP and secured via SSH [T1572], to communicate with their C2 infrastructure. FBI has observed multiple Qakbot C2s used in Royal ransomware attacks, but has not yet determined if Royal ransomware exclusively uses Qakbot C2s.
Royal actors often use RDP to move laterally across the network [T1021.001]. Microsoft Sysinternals tool PsExec has also been used to aid lateral movement. FBI has observed Royal actors using remote monitoring and management (RMM) software, such as AnyDesk, LogMeIn, and Atera, for persistence in the victim’s network [T1133]. In some instances, the actors moved laterally to the domain controller. In one confirmed case, the actors used a legitimate admin account to remotely log on to the domain controller [T1078]. Once on the domain controller, the threat actor deactivated antivirus protocols [T1562.001] by modifying Group Policy Objects [T1484.001].
Royal actors exfiltrate data from victim networks by repurposing legitimate cyber pentesting tools, such as Cobalt Strike, and malware tools and derivatives, such as Ursnif/Gozi, for data aggregation and exfiltration. According to third-party reporting, Royal actors’ first hop in exfiltration and other operations is usually a U.S. IP address.
Note: In reference to Cobalt Strike and other tools mentioned above, a tool repository used by Royal was identified at IP: 94.232.41[.]105 in December 2022.
Before starting the encryption process, Royal actors:
FBI has found numerous batch (.bat) files on impacted systems which are typically transferred as an encrypted 7zip file. Batch files create a new admin user [T1078.002], force a group policy update, set pertinent registry keys to auto-extract [T1119] and execute the ransomware, monitor the encryption process, and delete files upon completion—including Application, System, and Security event logs [T1070.001].
Malicious files have been found in victim networks in the following directories:
See table 1 and 2 for Royal ransomware IOCs that FBI obtained during threat response activities as of January 2023. Note: Some of the observed IP addresses are several months old. FBI and CISA recommend vetting or investigating these IP addresses prior to taking forward-looking action, such as blocking.
IOC
Description
.royal
Encrypted file extension
README.TXT
Ransom note
Malicious IP
Last Activity
102.157.44[.]105
November 2022
105.158.118[.]241
November 2022
105.69.155[.]85
November 2022
113.169.187[.]159
November 2022
134.35.9[.]209
November 2022
139.195.43[.]166
November 2022
139.60.161[.]213
November 2022
148.213.109[.]165
November 2022
163.182.177[.]80
November 2022
181.141.3[.]126
November 2022
181.164.194[.]228
November 2022
185.143.223[.]69
November 2022
186.64.67[.]6
November 2022
186.86.212[.]138
November 2022
190.193.180[.]228
November 2022
196.70.77[.]11
November 2022
197.11.134[.]255
November 2022
197.158.89[.]85
November 2022
197.204.247[.]7
November 2022
197.207.181[.]147
November 2022
197.207.218[.]27
November 2022
197.94.67[.]207
November 2022
23.111.114[.]52
November 2022
41.100.55[.]97
November 2022
41.107.77[.]67
November 2022
41.109.11[.]80
November 2022
41.251.121[.]35
November 2022
41.97.65[.]51
November 2022
42.189.12[.]36
November 2022
45.227.251[.]167
November 2022
5.44.42[.]20
November 2022
61.166.221[.]46
November 2022
68.83.169[.]91
November 2022
81.184.181[.]215
November 2022
82.12.196[.]197
November 2022
98.143.70[.]147
November 2022
140.82.48[.]158
December 2022
147.135.36[.]162
December 2022
147.135.11[.]223
December 2022
152.89.247[.]50
December 2022
179.43.167[.]10
December 2022
185.7.214[.]218
December 2022
193.149.176[.]157
December 2022
193.235.146[.]104
December 2022
209.141.36[.]116
December 2022
45.61.136[.]47
December 2022
45.8.158[.]104
December 2022
5.181.234[.]58
December 2022
5.188.86[.]195
December 2022
77.73.133[.]84
December 2022
89.108.65[.]136
December 2022
94.232.41[.]105
December 2022
47.87.229[.]39
January 2023
Malicious Domain
Last Observed
ciborkumari[.]xyz
October 2022
sombrat[.]com
October 2022
gororama[.]com
November 2022
softeruplive[.]com
November 2022
altocloudzone[.]live
December 2022
ciborkumari[.]xyz
December 2022
myappearinc[.]com
December 2022
parkerpublic[.]com
December 2022
pastebin.mozilla[.]org/Z54Vudf9/raw
December 2022
tumbleproperty[.]com
December 2022
myappearinc[.]com/acquire/draft/c7lh0s5jv
January 2023
Tool
SHA256
AV tamper
8A983042278BC5897DBCDD54D1D7E3143F8B7EAD553B5A4713E30DEFFDA16375
TCP/UDP Tunnel over HTTP (Chisel)
8a99353662ccae117d2bb22efd8c43d7169060450be413af763e8ad7522d2451
Ursnif/Gozi
be030e685536eb38ba1fec1c90e90a4165f6641c8dc39291db1d23f4ee9fa0b1
Exfil
B8C4AEC31C134ADBDBE8AAD65D2BCB21CFE62D299696A23ADD9AA1DE082C6E20
Remote Access (AnyDesk)
4a9dde3979c2343c024c6eeeddff7639be301826dd637c006074e04a1e4e9fe7
PowerShell Toolkit Downloader
4cd00234b18e04dcd745cc81bb928c8451f6601affb5fa45f20bb11bfb5383ce
PsExec (Microsoft Sysinternals)
08c6e20b1785d4ec4e3f9956931d992377963580b4b2c6579fd9930e08882b1c
Keep Host Unlocked (Don’t Sleep)
f8cff7082a936912baf2124d42ed82403c75c87cb160553a7df862f8d81809ee
Ransomware Executable
d47d4b52e75e8cf3b11ea171163a66c06d1792227c1cf7ca49d7df60804a1681
Windows Command Line (NirCmd)
216047C048BF1DCBF031CF24BD5E0F263994A5DF60B23089E393033D17257CB5
System Management (NSudo)
19896A23D7B054625C2F6B1EE1551A0DA68AD25CDDBB24510A3B74578418E618
Batch Scripts
Filename
Hash Value
2.bat
585b05b290d241a249af93b1896a9474128da969
3.bat
41a79f83f8b00ac7a9dd06e1e225d64d95d29b1d
4.bat
a84ed0f3c46b01d66510ccc9b1fc1e07af005c60
8.bat
c96154690f60a8e1f2271242e458029014ffe30a
kl.bat
65dc04f3f75deb3b287cca3138d9d0ec36b8bea0
gp.bat
82f1f72f4b1bfd7cc8afbe6d170686b1066049bc7e5863b51aa15ccc5c841f58
r.bat
74d81ef0be02899a177d7ff6374d699b634c70275b3292dbc67e577b5f6a3f3c
runanddelete.bat
342B398647073159DFA8A7D36510171F731B760089A546E96FBB8A292791EFEE
See table 3 for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques included in this advisory.
Initial Access
Technique Title
ID
Use
Exploit Public Facing Application
T1190
The actors gain initial access through public-facing applications.
Phishing: Spear phishing Attachment
T1566.001
The actors gain initial access through malicious PDF attachments sent via email.
Phishing: Spearphishing Link
T1566.002
The actors gain initial access using malvertising links via emails and public-facing sites.
External Remote Services
T1133
The actors gain initial access through a variety of RMM software.
Command and Control
Technique Title
ID
Use
Ingress Tool Transfer
T1105
The actors used C2 infrastructure to download multiple tools.
Protocol Tunneling
T1572
The actors used an encrypted SSH tunnel to communicate within C2 infrastructure.
Privilege Escalation
Technique Title
ID
Use
Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts
T1078.002
The actors used encrypted files to create new admin user accounts.
Defense Evasion
Technique Title
ID
Use
Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools
T1562.001
The actors deactivated antivirus protocols.
Domain Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification
T1484.001
The actors modified Group Policy Objects to subvert antivirus protocols.
Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs
T1070.001
The actors deleted shadow files and system and security logs after exfiltration.
Remote Desktop Protocol
T1021.001
The actors used valid accounts to move laterally through the domain controller using RDP.
Automated Collection
T1119
The actors used registry keys to auto-extract and collect files.
Impact
Technique Title
ID
Use
Data Encrypted for Impact
T1486
The actors encrypted data to determine which files were being used or blocked by other applications.
FBI and CISA recommend network defenders apply the following mitigations to limit potential adversarial use of common system and network discovery techniques and to reduce the risk of compromise by Royal ransomware. These mitigations follow CISA’s Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs), which provide a minimum set of practices and protections that are informed by the most common and impactful threats, tactics, techniques, and procedures, and which yield goals that all organizations across critical infrastructure sectors should implement:
FBI is seeking any information that can be shared, to include boundary logs showing communication to and from foreign IP addresses, a sample ransom note, communications with Royal actors, Bitcoin wallet information, decryptor files, and/or a benign sample of an encrypted file.
Additional details requested include: a targeted company Point of Contact, status and scope of infection, estimated loss, operational impact, transaction IDs, date of infection, date detected, initial attack vector, host and network based indicators.
FBI and CISA do not encourage paying ransom as payment does not guarantee victim files will be recovered. Furthermore, payment may also embolden adversaries to target additional organizations, encourage other criminal actors to engage in the distribution of ransomware, and/or fund illicit activities. Regardless of whether you or your organization have decided to pay the ransom, FBI and CISA urge you to promptly report ransomware incidents to a local FBI Field Office, or CISA at https://www.cisa.gov/report.
The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. CISA and FBI do not endorse any commercial product or service, including any subjects of analysis. Any reference to specific commercial products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by CISA or the FBI.
[1] Royal Rumble: Analysis of Royal Ransomware (cybereason.com)
[2] DEV-0569 finds new ways to deliver Royal ransomware, various payloads – Microsoft Security Blog
[3] 2023-01: ACSC Ransomware Profile – Royal | Cyber.gov.au
Recorded Future, Coveware, Digital Asset Redemption, Q6, and RedSense contributed to this CSA.
Please share your thoughts. We recently updated our anonymous Product Feedback Survey and we’d welcome your feedback.
Leave a Reply